Sometimes our intentions and beliefs exhibit a structure that proves us to be irrational. The Normativity of Rationality is concerned with the question of whether we ought to avoid such irrationality. Benjamin Kiesewetter defends the normativity of rationality by presenting a new solution to the problems that arise from the common assumption that we ought to be rational. The ar...(展开全部)

Rationality requires that we intend the means that we believe are necessary for achieving our ends. Instrumental Rationality explores the formulation and status of this requirement of means-ends coherence. In particular, it is concerned with understanding what means-ends coherence requires of us as believers and agents, and why. Means-ends coherence is a genuine requirement of ...(展开全部)

This volume is a selection of Broome's recent papers on normativity, rationality, and reasoning. It covers a variety of topics such as the meanings of 'ought', 'reason', and 'reasons'; the fundamental structure of normativity and the metaphysical priority of ought over reasons; the ownership - or agent-relativity - of oughts and reasons; the distinction between rationality and ...(展开全部)

The Roots of Normativity concerns one of the most basic philosophical questions: how to explain normativity in its many guises. Over many decades, Joseph Raz has sought to develop an answer to this question, according to which understanding normativity is understanding the roles and structures of normative reasons which, when they are reasons for action, are based on values. Th...(展开全部)

In the philosophy of law there has been a proliferation of advanced work in the last thirty years on the normativity of law. Recent theories explore law's character as a special kind of convention, shared cooperative activity, and social artifact, among other perspectives, to explain the precise way in which law provides subjects with reasons for action. Yet, for all their soph...(展开全部)

Ethical concepts are, or purport to be, normative. They make claims on us: they command, oblige, recommend, or guide. Or at least when we invoke them, we make claims on one another; but where does their authority over us - or ours over one another - come from? Christine Korsgaard identifies four accounts of the source of normativity that have been advocated by modern moral phil...(展开全部)

In the philosophy of law there has been a proliferation of advanced work in the last thirty years on the normativity of law. Recent theories explore law's character as a special kind of convention, shared cooperative activity, and social artifact, among other perspectives, to explain the precise way in which law provides subjects with reasons for action. Yet, for all their soph...(展开全部)

Ethical concepts are, or purport to be, normative. They make claims on us: they command, oblige, recommend, or guide. Or at least when we invoke them, we make claims on one another; but where does their authority over us - or ours over one another - come from? Christine Korsgaard identifies four accounts of the source of normativity that have been advocated by modern moral phil...(展开全部)

The Roots of Normativity concerns one of the most basic philosophical questions: how to explain normativity in its many guises. Over many decades, Joseph Raz has sought to develop an answer to this question, according to which understanding normativity is understanding the roles and structures of normative reasons which, when they are reasons for action, are based on values. Th...(展开全部)

An important division in the human mind is between perception and reasoning. Perceptual experiences are conscious, but much of our reasoning is unconscious. Reasoning can be better or worse, but perception is considered beyond reproach. We reason from information that we have already, but perception is a means of getting new information. The Rationality of Perception argues tha...(展开全部)